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Abstract
We emphasize that standard quantum theory (SQT) is incomplete because
it doesn’t describe what is experimentally observed, namely events, nor does
it satisfactorily define the circumstances under which events may occur. Sim-
ple models are given (all of which have the same density matrix evolution) to
illustrate schemes which claim to complete SQT. It is shown how the model
based upon the Continuous Spontaneous Localization (CSL) theory, in which
an individual statevector undergoes “True Collapse,” gives a satisfactory de-
scription of events. It is argued that various “decoherence” based approaches,
illustrated by models in which a density matrix undergoes “False Collapse,” do
not satisfactorily resolve these problems of SQT.
1 Introduction
The abrupt change by measurement. . . is the most interesting point of the
entire theory. Erwin Schro¨dinger1
To restrict quantum mechanics to be exclusively about piddling laboratory
operations is to betray the great enterprise. John Bell2
What is wrong with standard quantum theory (SQT)? Doesn’t it give
wonderful agreement with every experiment so far performed? Then why should
anyone wish to change it?
I had better say what I mean by SQT. I mean the usual formalism which
results in a statevector, taken to correspond to the physical reality we see around
us in Nature,3 evolving with time, together with the Born probability rule. A
structure which modifies (adds to, and/or alters) this shall either be called an
interpretation of SQT or a different theory.
What is wrong with SQT is its description of quantum events. It doesn’t
describe them. Consider a particle counting experiment being conducted by
an experimenter while a theoretician does a parallel real time calculation us-
ing SQT. The experimenter sets up the apparatus while the theoretician sets
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up the initial statevector. While the experimenter turns on the apparatus and
monitors its smooth functioning, the theoretician follows the smooth evolution
of the statevector according to Schro¨dinger’s equation. Suddenly, the exper-
imenter sings out “An event has occurred, and this is the result.” Abruptly,
the theoretician stops his calculation, replaces the statevector, which has by
now become the sum of states corresponding to different possible outcomes of
the experiment, by the one state which the experimenter told him had actu-
ally occurred, and then continues his calculation of the smooth evolution of the
statevector.
In other words, the practitioner of SQT must go outside the theory, to
obtain additional information, in order to use the theory correctly. What is
missing is that the theory doesn’t give the probability that an event occurs
between t and t + dt. (One doesn’t expect the theory to give the precise time
an event occurs: that choice may be attributed to a fundamental probabilistic
feature of nature.) Instead, the Born probability rule says, if an event occurs,
then these are the possible results and their chances. Thus the description
by SQT of every experiment is insufficient because events take place in every
experiment and SQT fails to describe them.4
A theory which gives a conditional probability alone is incapable of shed-
ding light on the nature of the thing that is conditioned upon. Would we not
say that something important is missing from a theory whose sole statement is,
“If a cataclysmic event occurs in the solar system, then here are the possible
things that can happen to the earth and their chances?” It might be useful to
know the chances of destruction and the forms it may take, but would we not
be curious about the missing portion of the description? Would we not want
to know something about when it might occur, to inquire about the causes of
cataclysmic events, about what makes the sun explode, or an asteroid stray our
way, even though we might never be able to affect those events? How has it
been that we have been so incurious about what makes quantum events? Per-
haps because the situation has been more like, “If a profitable financial event
occurs, then here are the possibilities and their chances.” We have been so busy
reaping the profits of quantum theory that we have not cared to inquire about
the cause of the profitable events.
Tacit in this discussion was the assumption that we know how to choose
the“preferred basis” which specifies the catalog of possible events. But SQT
doesn’t tell us this either. Interpretations attempt to supply the missing in-
formation. The so-called (there are many variants) Copenhagen interpretation
(CI) declares that the preferred basis describes the results of measurements by
an apparatus. But it doesn’t say what is an apparatus or a measurement (and
it doesn’t tell us if or how events can occur in other situations). Again, we must
go outside the theory, to obtain ad hoc (“for this case only”) information to
use the theory. Useful? Wonderfully. CI is a good practical guide for working
physicists. Measurement by an apparatus is like great art, we know it when
we see it—and we have great artists who can bring it about. But, a complete
theoretical description? No.
To summarize, SQT has two unsolved problems, which I shall call the
“events problem” (what is the probability that an event occurs in any time
interval?) and the ”preferred basis” problem (given that the event occurs,
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what are the possible outcomes?), i.e., “when?” and “what?”
How might one approach solving the events problem? Consider an anal-
ogous situation in classical mechanics. An experimenter throws a ball toward
a wall while a theoretician follows its smooth evolution according to Newton’s
second law. Suddenly the experimenter sings out, “It hit the wall, and this is
now its position and velocity.” Abruptly the theoretician stops the calculation,
replaces the position and velocity by the new values and continues the calcula-
tion of the smooth evolution of the ball. Clearly one would think, “This is not
a complete theoretical description,” and one would procede to incorporate the
wall (and the ball’s interaction with it) into Newton’s second law so that the
theoretical description is self contained. It seems equally clear that quantum
theory needs to have (what amounts to) the wall put in.
In the Continuous Spontaneous Localization4−6 (CSL) theory, a term is
added to Schro¨dinger’s equation, resulting in a smoothly evolving statevector
which describes events. The modified equation produces
|ψ >−→ |a > OR |b > OR . . . (1.1)
instead of what SQT produces:
|ψ >−→ |a > + |b > + . . . (1.2)
The additional term contains a randomly fluctuating field, and it is this field
which determines the events that actually occur. Thus the theory gives an
explanation as to why we get a different result when we repeat the same exper-
iment (the field fluctuated like this rather than like that), in contrast to SQT
which gives no reason at all why events occur.
Eq.(1.1) describes what I call True Collapse7. In section 2, I shall give a
simple mathematical model of it, using the CSL formalism. This simple model
does not do full justice to the physical ideas contained in the full-blown CSL
theory. In particular, it does not show how the equations use the particle num-
ber basis to solve the preferred basis problem, nor how they make collapse very
slow for microscopic objects and very fast for macroscopic objects. (Also not
touched upon here are interesting interpretational aspects of CSL, the pictures
of spacetime reality that it allows, the successes and problems of a relativistic
generalization, the status of experimental tests: the reader is referred to the
references.)
There are a number of schemes, so-called “decoherence” interpretations,
which claim to be able to describe events without altering Schro¨dinger’s evo-
lution of the statevector, i.e., without providing a collapse picture. In this
paper I shall examine whether these schemes do provide satisfactory criteria
for identifying events. In sections 3.1-3.3 I shall give two simple examples of
one approach (dubbed here False Collapse of the first kind) based upon the
behavior of the density matrix describing an ensemble of statevectors, each of
which evolves like (1.2). (Each statevector in the ensemble may be thought of
as describing the interaction of a system with a different bath state.) I shall
argue that this gives no help in explaining the occurrence of events.
In sections 4.1-4.2, I shall give simple examples of two schemes (dubbed here
False Collapse of the second kind), the Environmental Selection Interpretation8
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(ESI) and the Decoherent Histories Interpretation9 (DHI). They are based upon
the behavior of a partial trace of the density matrix constructed from a sin-
gle statevector which evolves like (1.2). I shall argue that these, too, are not
satisfactory.
Lastly, in section 5, I shall give a simple example of how a no-collapse
scheme can account for events. However, it requires adding new dynamical
variables to physics. The point I wish to make is that you cannot hope to
describe events “on the cheap,” without adding something new to SQT.
2 A True Collapse Model
One line of development would be to have the jump in the equations and not
just the talk— so that it would come about as a dynamical process in dynamically
defined conditions. . . . It would be good to know how this could be done.
John Bell10
For illustrative purposes I shall present a pale imitation of the full-blown
CSL theory. Suppose that normal hamiltonian evolution has produced the
statevector
|ψ, 0 >= α|a > +β|b >, |α|2 + |β|2 = 1 (2.1)
where |a > and |b > are eigenstates of an operator A with eigenvalues a and b.
These states may be thought of as describing different “pointer positions,” i.e.,
as macroscopically different. The statevector evolution is presumed governed
thereafter by the modified Schro¨dinger equation
d|ψ, t >w
dt
= −iH |ψ, t >w − 1
4λ
[w(t)− 2λA]2|ψ, t >w (2.2)
with H = 0 (H may be supposed negligible because now it only affects the
internal evolution of the pointer states). In Eq.(2.2), w(t) is an arbitrary func-
tion of time (in the mathematical class of white noise “functions”), and λ is the
collapse rate (a fundamental parameter of the theory).
If you put any w(t) into Eq.(2.2) you will find the statevector |ψ, t >w
which has evolved under it. But, what is the probability that nature has chosen
this w(t)? To answer this question the model supplies a second equation, a
probability rule:
Prob{w(t) for 0 ≤ t ≤ T } = Dw w< ψ, t|ψ, t >w (2.3)
Eq.(2.3) says that the largest norm statevectors are most probable (the evolu-
tion (2.2) is nonunitary, so the statevector norm changes with time).
In Eq.(2.3), Dw is the functional integral element:
Dw ≡
t=T∏
t=0
dw(t)√
2piλ(dt)−1
(2.4)
Since I shall use functional notation, I will say a bit about it. The way to
look at an expression such as
∫∞
−∞
Dw exp−(2λ)−1 ∫ T0 dtw2(t) is to discretize
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it. That is, replace the continuous variable t by tn replace the integral over t
by a sum over n, treat each w(tn) like an ordinary variable and treat dt like a
number: thus this expression = 1.
We can easily write the solution of Eq. (2.2) with the initial condition (2.1)
because the result only depends upon B(T ) ≡ ∫ T
0
dtw(t):
|ψ, T >w = F{w(t)}
·
{
α|a > e− 14λT [B(T )−2λTa]2 + β|b > e− 14λT [B(T )−2λTb]2
}
(2.5)
apart from an overall factor F which is a functional I shall not bother to write
down. We can now use Eq.(2.3) to find the probability that a particular B(t)
(and the statevector it engenders) occurs in Nature. Taking the scalar product
of (2.5) with itself, and integrating over w(t) for all t except T , we obtain for
the probability that B(T ) lies in the interval B to B + dB:
Prob =
dB√
2piλT
{
|α|2e− 12λT [B(T )−2λTa]2 + |β|2e− 12λT [B(T )−2λTb]2
}
(2.6)
From Eq.(2.6) we see that, as T increases, the only probable values of
B lie within a few standard deviations
√
λT of either 2λTa or 2λTb. In the
former case, the statevector (2.5) asymptotically approaches const.|a >, while
in the latter case it asymptotically approaches const.|b >. (The constants are
of no significance since it is the statevector’s direction in Hilbert space that
contains the information about reality: the statevector can be renormalized
at any time.) Moreover, in the former case, the integrated probability (2.6)
asymptotically approaches |α|2 and in the later case approaches |β|2. Thus the
statevector evolves into one or another of the macroscopically distinct states,
and does so with the frequencies predicted by SQT.
To summarize, Schro¨dinger’s evolution of the statevector can be modified,
in a well-defined and reasonably simple way, so as to give good agreement with
SQT’s predictions while describing events (paralleling the occurrence of each
event in Nature with collapse of a probable statevector).
We close this section by displaying the density matrix which describes the
behavior of the ensemble of (normalized) solutions to Eq.(2.2) which occur with
probability (2.3):
ρ(T ) =
∫
Dw w< ψ, T |ψ, T >w |ψ, T >w w< ψ, T |
w< ψ, T |ψ, T >w
=
∫
Dw|ψ, T >w w< ψ, T |
=
∫ ∞
−∞
dB√
2piλT
{
|α|2e− 12λT [B(T )−2λTa]2 |a >< a| (2.7)
+ |β|2e− 12λT [B(T )−2λTb]2 |b >< b|
+
[
αβ∗|a >< b|+ α∗β|b >< a|
]
e−
1
4λT
[B(T )−2λTa]2e−
1
4λT
[B(T )−2λTb]2
}
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= |α|2|a >< a|+ |β|2|b >< b|
+
[
αβ∗|a >< b|+ α∗β|b >< a|
]
e−
λT
2
(a−b)2
The reason why the off-diagonal elements of the density matrix (2.7) are expo-
nentially decaying is because the individual statevector collapses (corresponding
to different B(T )’s) occur at different times.
3.1 False Collapse Of The First Kind
If it looks like a duck but it don’t walk like a duck or quack like a duck then
it ain’t a duck. Variant of an old saying
For my first example of a decoherence scheme I shall consider a a simple
model of the interaction of the system described by the operator A with an
environment. We suppose that each time the system is put into a thermal bath
it encounters a different bath state, and one can assign probabilities to these
encounters. The claim is that interaction of the system with the bath brings
on occurrences of events.
Consider the initial statevector (2.1) which evolves unitarily under the
Schro¨dinger equation
d|ψ, t >w
dt
= −iw(t)A|ψ, t >w (3.1)
In Eq.(3.1), w(t) is a sample function of white noise (representing the influence
of the bath). That is, we assume repeated evolutions actually differ in w(t),
whose probability of appearance satisfies the probability rule:
Prob{w(t) for 0 ≤ t ≤ T } = Dwe− 12λ
∫
T
0
dtw2(t)
(3.2)
It follows from Eqs.(2.1) and (3.1) that the statevector at any time T which
evolves under a particular w(t) is
|ψ, T >w= αe−iB(T )a|a > +βe−iB(T )b|b > (3.3)
Now, according to Eq.(3.3), NOTHING has HAPPENED, i.e., the state-
vector is still a superposition of the states |a > and |b > with unchanged squared
amplitudes. Of course, the phases of the amplitudes are changing, but certainly
one cannot find in this statevector evidence that an event occurred or, supposing
that an event occurred, whether it resulted in a or b.
Nonetheless, proponents of the point of view I am expounding are unphased
(sic), and they turn to the density matrix:
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ρ(T ) =
∫
Dwe
− 1
2λ
∫
T
0
dtw2(t)|ψ, T >w w< ψ, T |
=
∫ ∞
−∞
dB√
2piλT
e−
1
2λT
B2(T )
{
|α|2|a >< a|+ |β|2|b >< b|
+
[
αβ∗e−iB(T )(a−b)|a >< b|+ α∗βeiB(T )(a−b)|b >< a|
]}
= |α|2|a >< a|+ |β|2|b >< b|
+
[
αβ∗|a >< b|+ α∗β|b >< a|
]
e−
λT
2
(a−b)2
(3.4)
The False Collapse claim is that, at some large time, when the off-diagonal den-
sity matrix elements are suitably small (in current parlance, at the decoherence
time), an event (a or b) occurs for any system.
This claim makes no sense, for two reasons. The behavior of an ensemble
of evolutions which have not taken place cannot be crucial in determining the
occurrence of an event in one evolution which did take place (what is not real
cannot have an effect upon what is real). If no individual statevector describes
events, an ensemble of these statevectors cannot do so (a property missing in
each element of a collection must be missing in the collection). Therefore this
scheme cannot solve the events problem. Although the density matrices (2.7)
and (3.4) have the same form, this does not mean that the arguments leading
to these expressions are equally sound.
3.2 Against Decoherence
In order to properly assess the meaning of Eq.(3.4), I believe it is salutary
to avoid using the phrase “decoherence” time because that seems to imply that
there is a physical process called decoherence which takes this amount of time
to be completed. I suggest that the phrase“No One Will Ever kNow” time, or
NOWEN time for short, is more apt for the following reason.
If the statevector evolution is as described in the previous section, then an
event does not occur at any time. Suppose, however, you (wrongly) claim that
an event occurs at time Te. Suppose someone sets out to test your claim by
performing a rapid experiment at time T = Te (then causing an event to occur)
which tests if the system is in the state |φ >≡ µ|a > +ν|b >. If an event (a or
b) did occur at time Te, the system will be found to be in the state |φ > with
probability |α|2|µ|2 + |β|2|ν|2. But actually, it follows from Eq.(3.4) that the
probability is
Tr
{|φ >< φ|ρ(T )} = |α|2|µ|2 + |β|2|ν|2 + 2ℜ{αβ∗νµ∗}e−λT2 (a−b)2 (3.5)
The NOWEN time is, by definition, a time at which the last term in Eq.(3.5)
is small enough to be beyond experimental resolution. Only if you chose Te to
be equal to or greater than the NOWEN time will the experimental result be
the same as if your claim were right. With this choice, No One Will Ever kNow
that you were wrong.
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3.3 A Simple Environment Model
The example in section 3.1 described the bath by the c-number w(t). Per-
haps a more realistic example would be to include the bath states in the stat-
evector. In this case, first, the density matrix for the ensemble of joint system
+ bath states is constructed. Then the bath states are traced over, and the
NOWEN time is declared to be the time by which events have taken place.
I shall give an example of this here, largely because the simple environment
bath model will be useful in the remainder of this paper.
Imagine a system which is bombarded by a succession of particles which
briefly interact with it and then travel away. A simple model which captures
the essence is to suppose that the nth particle has position coordinate Wn, and
that it interacts with the system during the time interval (tn, tn + ∆t) with
hamiltonian AWn. Proceeding to the limit ∆t→ 0 of a continuum of operators
Wn →W (t) which mutually commute, we have the evolution equation
d|ψ, t >
dt
= −iAW (t)|ψ, t > (3.6)
We shall denote a joint position eigenvector by |{w} >, i.e., W (t)|{w} >=
w(t)|{w} >: −∞ < w(t) < ∞. (One may think of |{w} > as the direct
product of position eigenstates ofW (t) for each vaue of t.) We now construct a
unity-normalized state |{w} >N which is as close to an eigenstate of W (t) with
eigenvalue w(t) as one wishes, i.e.,
|{w} >N≡
∏
t
{
∫ ∞
−∞
dw′(t)f [w′(t)− w(t)]}|{w′} >
where f [w′ − w] is sharply peaked at w′ − w = 0, and ∫∞
−∞
dw′f2[w′ − w] = 1.
(f is essentially the square root of a delta function.)
We suppose that, each time the system is put into the bath of these bom-
barding particles, the initial statevector is
|ψ, 0 >=
[
α|a > +β|b >
]
|{w} >N (3.7)
and the probability that the bath state |{w} >N appears with eigenvalues
{w(t)} is given by the white noise probability expression (3.2).
The solution of Schro¨dinger’s equation (3.6) with initial statevector (3.7) is
|ψ, T >=
{
αe−iB(T )a|a > +βe−iB(T )b|b >
}
|{w} >N (3.8)
As in section 3.1 we cannot infer that an event has occurred from such a stat-
evector. (This statement would still be correct had we chosen an initial stat-
evector for the environment where f was not sharply peaked, so that each final
state of system + environment would be an entangled one—see the next sec-
tion.) Also, it follows from Eq.(3.8) that, if we construct the density matrix
and trace over the environment states, we get the density matrix (3.4). This be-
havior of the statevector or density matrix is in no essential way different from
what has already been described, and the critical remarks already expressed
apply to it.
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4.1 False Collapse of the Second Kind
The idea that elimination of coherence, in one way or another, implies
the replacement of “and” by “or” is a very common one among solvers of the
“measurement problem.” It has always puzzled me. John Bell2
In this section I shall address the ESI.8 Here, as in CSL, only one stat-
evector represents the world. However, the world is divided into two: “the
environment” and the rest. But ESI does not define what is meant by envi-
ronment any better than CI defines apparatus. This already is a basis (pun!)
for serious criticism: the very nature of the real world, the preferred basis,
depends upon this undefined choice. Thus ESI does not resolve the preferred
basis problem any better than does CI.
Moreover, the choice of the division affects the predicted times of events as
well, so already the events problem is faring badly. But, never mind, suppose
that we somehow know what is the system and what is the environment. Con-
sider the following initial statevector belonging to the system + environment
modeled in section 3.3:
|ψ, 0 >=
[
α|a > +β|b >
] ∫
D∞0 we
− 1
4λ
∫
∞
0
dtw2(t)|{w} > (4.1)
where Dt2t1w ≡
∏t2
t=t1
dw(t)/[2piλ/dt]1/4. That is, each particle’s position has an
initial gaussian probability distribution. The evolution equation is (3.6). The
resulting statevector is
|ψ, T > =
{
α|a >
∫
DT0 we
−
∫
T
0
dtw(t)[ia+(4λ)−1w(t)]|{w} >T0
+ β|b >
∫
DT0 we
−
∫
T
0
dtw(t)[ib+(4λ)−1w(t)]|{w} >T0
}
·
∫
D∞T+we
− 1
4λ
∫
∞
T+
dtw2(t)|{w} >∞T+
(4.2)
where |{w} >t2t1 is the joint position eigenstate ofW (t) for t in the range {t1, t2}.
The statevector (4.2) shows that the states |a > and |b > are now entangled
with the “environment” particle states labeled by t from 0 to T (the particles
labeled by t from T+ to ∞ have yet to interact with the system, so their states
are not yet entangled.) But, just as with the statevectors (3.3) and (3.8), this
statevector gives no indication that an event (a or b) has occurred.
However, if one constructs the density matrix and traces over the environ-
ment, one gets for this reduced density matrix precisely the last two expressions
in (3.4). Again, the claim is made that either event a or b has taken place by
the NOWEN time, i.e., there will be no difference between future behavior
predicted by using the uncollapsed statevector (4.2) or by using the mixture of
collapsed statevectors |a > |enva, T > and |b > |envb, T > (present in respective
amounts |α|2 and |β|2).
This ESI claim is demonstrably false. An experiment could detect inter-
ference, which would be missing for the mixture, between the two system +
environment states which compose the actual statevector (4.2).
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Here is an example in the context of our model. Suppose each W (t) rep-
resents the x-coordinate of an extremely massive particle at rest in the z = 0
plane, with y-coordinate t (take 0 ≤ t ≤ T ≥NOWEN time). Let A be the
x-coordinate of an extremely massive particle (the A-particle) moving in the
z = 0 plane in the y-direction with constant speed 1. As the A-particle passes
each environment particle W (t) at time t, it briefly interacts with it. (The
hamiltonian in the evolution equation (3.6) is consistent with this picture). Let
the initial state be (4.1) (with D∞0 replaced by D
T
0 ). The A-particle is therefore
in a superposition of two packets, one at A = a, the other at A = b.
After the A-particle has passed the last environment particle at y = T
(resulting in the statevector (4.2) without the last line), let it encounter a
corner reflector (corner placed on the y−axis, with walls at 45◦ to the y−axis).
Thus, when the A-particle has bounced off the two walls, it has changed the
sign of its x-coordinate (so |a > and |b > have become | − a > and | − b >) and
reversed its direction of motion, returning with speed 1 to collide with the row
of environment particles in reverse order.
It really isn’t necessary, but one can imagine placing four mirrors which
take the A-particle out of the z = 0 plane for a while, and bring it back so that
it is once again headed to encounter the row of environment particles in the
order in which it first encountered them. Then, the Schro¨dinger evolution will
effectively be the time-reverse of the previous evolution. That is, −a (−b) is
the eigenvalue of A acting upon | − a > (| − b >) as well as the eigenvalue of
−A acting upon |a > (|b >). Thus the effect of the evolution (3.6) upon the
numerical coefficients in the state {(4.2) with |a > and |b > replaced by |− a >
and | − b >} is the same as if A were replaced by −A and |a > and |b > were
unchanged.
Thus, after the A-particle’s second trip past the environment particles, the
entanglement has been undone. The resulting state’s system part, α| − a >
+β| − b >, can certainly be distinguished from the purported mixture of states
| − a > and | − b >.
ESI proponents reply to this that what they mean by an environment
is something so complicated that FAPP11 it would be impossible to do such
interference experiments. This is the NOWEN philosophy par excellence. To
base a fundamental physical principle upon it is no more justified than basing
morality upon the principle that it is all right to steal if you don’t get caught.
We conclude that ESI doesn’t solve either the preferred basis problem or
the events problem.
4.2 Against Decoherent Histories
It ain’t over till it’s over. Yogi Berra
I shall describe the DHI9 somewhat differently than usual, namely, that
the evolution is that of a single unitarily evolving statevector representing our
world. (Usually, a unitarily evolving density matrix is considered. If it is
pure, it is equivalent to a single statevector. If it is impure, it is equivalent
to an ensemble of statevectors, which was criticized in section 3.1.) A certain
“decoherence condition,” (see Eq.(4.3) et.seq.) is applied to the density matrix
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constructed from this statevector. It is claimed that one can thereby extract a
set of “histories,” with each history characterised by a string of events (and a
probability that this string is the one realized in our world). For each history,
we are told of the times of the events and projection operators associated with
these times. The predictions are the same as for a True Collapse theory where
instantaneous collapses are characterized by applying each projection operator
at the associated time to the otherwise unitarily evolving statevector.
Are a unique set of projection operators obtained from DHI? No. As in
ESI, the world is divided into two parts, the part that is “coarse grained”
and the part that is not (these may vary with time). Coarse graining means
that the variables of this part are not to be distinguished by the projection
operators. But, to be undistinguished does not mean to be unimportant. The
coarse grained variables are usually crucial in determining which events are said
to occur and when the events occur. The “environment” is a favorite candidate
for these coarse grained variables. But, just as in ESI, these variables are not
specified by DHI, and so the preferred basis problem is unsolved, and the events
problem is given no unique solution.
But, never mind, suppose we somehow know that the coarse grained vari-
ables should be the environment in the model of the previous section. Suppose
that (4.1) is the initial statevector. Let it evolve for time T ′ according to the
Schro¨dinger evolution (3.6), at which time an experiment is done to see if the
system is in state |φ >≡ µ|a > +ν|b > or |φ′ >≡ ν∗|a > −µ∗|b >. The question
we now ask is whether DHI assigns an event (a or b) to a time T < T ′.
The answer to this, we are told, is to consider the magnitude of the off-
diagonal elements of the “Decoherence Functional,” such as
|Tr{ei
∫
T
′
T
dtAW (t)
(|φ >< φ|e−i
∫
T
′
T
dtAW (t)
[|a >< a|ρ(T )|b >< b|]}| =
|µναβ|e− λT
′
2
(a−b)2
(4.3)
(the decaying exponential is just < envb, T
′|enva, T ′ >), where the projection
operators |a >< a| and |b >< b| are applied at time T . If these elements are
small enough to be neglected (according to some prearranged limit), an event
is assigned to time T .
But, as can be seen from Eq.(4.3), the off-diagonal elements do not depend
upon T , but only upon T ′. That is, whether or not an event takes place at
an earlier time depends upon the time that the later experiment is performed.
In DHI, the past depends upon the future. Here is an example of how the
arbitrarily distant future can affect the past. Suppose the above evolution
takes place for an arbitrarily long time interval T ′, after which the effectively
time-reversed evolution described in section 4.1 takes place for an interval T ′,
followed by the experiment at time 2T ′. Due to the evolution between T ′ and
2T ′, the environment states coupled to |a > and |b > grow identical instead
of near orthogonal, and so the decoherence condition is not satisfied. Thus,
because of this future evolution (between T ′ and 2T ′), an event which would
have otherwise occurred in the past (at T << T ′) never occurs at all.
The decoherence condition is designed so NOWEN that DHI is wrong. If
at any time in the future an experiment takes place that measures interference
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between earlier states which would otherwise be said to represent earlier alter-
native events, DHI disallows the occurrence of these events. One could imagine
a theory in which the future has an effect on the immediate past, or a miniscule
effect on the arbitrarily distant past, but it is hard to consider as satisfactory a
description of past events which can be undone by behavior in the arbitrarily
distant future. It is only when the statevector evolution is all over that DHI
says for sure what the histories are. If the world goes on forever, DHI may well
be characterized by the New York Lottery slogan, “Hey, ya never know.” To
have to wait until the end of the universe, or forever, to be able to describe
events is not a solution of the events problem.
I shall conclude this section by mentioning the view a proponent of CSL
could take of ESI and DHI. According to CSL, True Collapse from a super-
position of states to one or another state is brought about by differences in
particle locations in the different states: the more the differences, the faster the
collapse. A decoherence condition may not predict events in situations when
they do occur and vice versa. However, there are cases where the differences
in particle locations are such that CSL says events occur, and the choice of the
environment or coarse graining is such that False Collapsers will also say that
events occur. Although it is unlikely that the latter will get such details as
the time of events right, these differences may be unobservable. Thus these ap-
proaches may be regarded, just as CI may, as FAPP11 procedures for predicting
that events will occur in some cases.
5 Index Model
There is more in heaven and earth. . . William Shakespeare
There are two reasons why the False Collapse approaches fail to satisfac-
torily handle events. The first is that they hope to rely upon known objects in
spacetime to provide the preferred basis, but this does not seem to be do-able
in a well-defined way. The second is that the states describing such objects can
evolve from near-orthogonality (which is what is used as a criteria for events)
back to nonorthogonality (which undermines the predictions of events).
It is perhaps interesting to see that the program of describing events by a
unitarily evolving statevector could go through if the objects which determine
the preferred basis are not the usual objects in spacetime, and if the evolution
is such that their orthogonality, once achieved, cannot be undone. Models
illustrating this can be made,12−14 and I shall end this paper by giving one,
partially to serve as a bridge on which False Collapsers and True Collapsers
may meet.
Consider the initial statevector (4.1) evolving unitarily according to the
Schro¨dinger equation
d|ψ, t >
dt
= −i2λAΠ(t)|ψ, t >, [W (t),Π(t′)] = iδ(t− t′) (5.1)
The W (t)’s are to represent new and fundamental variables of Nature (be-
yond the usual particles and fields), each of which Nature allows to interact
with the system (composed of the usual particles and fields) only for a brief
interval dt, and never again. The resulting statevector is
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|ψ, T >=
{∫
D∞T+we
− 1
4λ
∫
∞
T+
dtw2(t)|{w} >∞T+
}
·
∫
DT0 w|{w} >T0
{
α|a > e− 14λ
∫
T
0
dt[w(t)−2λa]2
+ β|b > e− 14λ
∫
T
0
dt[w(t)−2λb]2
}
(5.2a)
which may more transparently, if less precisely, be written as
|ψ, T >=
{
|state of uninteracted w(t), T < t <∞ >
}
·
∑
all w(t), 0≤t≤T
|state labeled by w(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T >
{
|ψ, T >CSLw
} (5.2b)
According to Eq. (5.2), the evolution correlates each CSL state (2.5) (which
evolves under a w(t)) to an “environment” state (labeled by that w(t)). The
statevector is the “sum” of these correlated product states (with the correct
CSL probability weighting). Each of these states in the “sum” is a history. One
history, chosen on-line “by God” (utilizing SQT’s transition probabilities as each
state “forks” into its unique orthogonal alternatives) represents reality and the
others represent unrealized possibilities. There is a satisfactory solution to the
preferred basis problem: the preferred basis is well defined by the orthogonal
“environment” basis. There is a satisfactory solution to the events problem: the
nonorthogonal system states (correlated to the orthogonal “environment” basis
states) describe the macroscopic system undergoing True Collapse to state a or
b.
Of course, this model is physically completely equivalent to the True Col-
lapse model of section 2. It suggests that density matrix’s False Collapse only
makes sense if, actually, it corresponds to statevector’s True Collapse.
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